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THE NEED FOR CLOSING ARGUMENT GUIDELINES
IN JURY TRIALS
MICHAEL J. AHLEN °
I. INTRODUCTION
Closing arguments are an essential element of North Dakota's sys-
tem of trial by jury.' A good closing argument can aid juries in under-
standing even the most complex cases by providing:
1. The advocate's best opportunity to explain the theory of the
case in its entirety with minimal interruption.2
2., A forum to demonstrate the importance of details as well as
to show the relationship of items of evidence to each other
and to the theory of the case.3
3. The best occasion for counsel to urge the jury to draw con-
clusions and make inferences from the evidence.4
4. A time for attorneys to show how the evidence satisfies all
legal requirements for a verdict in favor of a client.5
5. An occasion to rebut an 'opponent's allegations and per-
suade the jury that the client's position is correct.6
6. An opportunity to confront head-on the prejudices which
jurors may unknowingly bring with them in their
deliberations.r
7. A chance to persuade the jury that justice is best served by
returning a verdict for the attorney's client.8
Unfortunately, improper arguments to juries have become common-
place in many jurisdictions. 9 Attorneys have used summation to mislead
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1. Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97, 101 (N.D. 1977) (holding that the parties have the
right to closing arguments in nonjury cases as well as in both civil and criminal jury trials).
2. STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADvocAcY 385 (1993).
3. Id.
4. Id, at 393-94.
5. J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAw, TACTICS AND ETmICS 370 (2d ed. 1993).
6. Id.
7. JAMES W. McELHANEY, McELHANEY'S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 496 (2d ed. 1987).
8. See sample argument in JAMES W. JEANS, SR., TRIAL ADVOCACY 18.9 (2d ed. 1993).
9. See generally, Brian McKeon et al., Prosecutorial Misconduct, in Project, 7enty-second
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1991-
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juries as to the law10 and the evidence."' Some have even used highly
emotional tactics in an attempt to frighten jurors into granting favorable
verdicts.'
2
In other jurisdictions, there appears to be an increased willingness
to tighten control over remarks made in argument.13  Attorney miscon-
duct during closing argument recently caused the Minnesota Supreme
Court to reverse a conviction even though the defendant's counsel neither
objected to the argument nor proved prejudice. 14 The opinion evidenced
such continuing frustration over instances of misconduct in summation by
both defense and prosecuting attorneys that it reprinted the American
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice relating to closing
arguments.' 5
1992, 81 CEO. L.J. 1267, 1356-67 (1993) (collecting significant federal criminal cases involving
inappropriate arguments).
10. Compare People v. Gutierrez, 605 N.E.2d 1110, 1116 ( III. App. 3d 1992) (finding reversible
error in attorney's attempt to improperly shift the burden of proof) with People v. Deasee, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 505 (Cal. App. 2d 1993) (ridiculing the reasonable doubt standard by prosecuting attorney).
11. E.g., Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. Carter, 848 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (inviting
jurors to consider matters not in evidence).
12. Cf. City of Canton v. Lerario, No. CA-9147, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4186, at "4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 16, 1993) (discussing prosecutor's warning to jury against finding defendants not guilty and
thereby letting them sell drugs in the jurors' neighborhoods).
13. See, e.g., Guthrie v. State, 616 So. 2d 914, 931 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Kitze v.
Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 583, 586 (Va. 1993) and supra notes 9-12.
14. State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1993) (en banc). The prosecuting attorney
indicated that the defense argument would attempt to focus attention away from the defendant and
onto a prosecution witness just as defense attorneys normally do in similar cases. Id at 818-19. The
prosecutor also continually commented on the need for accountability to a point that the jury might
have been distracted from the other issues in the case. Id. at 819.
15. Id. at 817-18.
Standard 3-5.8. Argument to the jury.
(a) The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record.
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the
evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for the'prosecutor to express his or her personal
belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt
of the defendant.
(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or
prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from
its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the
guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making
predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict.
(e) It is the responsibility of the court to ensure that final argument to the jury is kept
within proper, accepted bounds.
Standard 4-7.8. Argument to the jury
(a) In closing argument to the jury the lawyer [i.e. defense counsel] may argue all
reasonabre inferences from the evidence in the record. It is unprofessional
conduct for a lawyer intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the juy as
to the inferences it may draw.
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to express a personal belief or opinion in
his or her client's innocence or personal belief or opinion in the truth or falsity of
any testimony or evidence, or to attribute the crime to another person unless such
an inference is warranted by the evidence.
(c) A lawyer should not make arguments calculated to inflame the passions or
prejudices of the jury.
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North Dakota has not avoided the problem of inappropriate com-
ment in closing argument.' 6  During the years from 1930 to 1960, there
were relatively few appeals which alleged that inappropriate argument
had been made. Today, however, allegations of prejudicial closing argu-
ments are much more common in both civil and criminal cases. Roughly
half of all North Dakota appeals concerning prejudicial summations ever
filed have been filed within the last fifteen years. While the number of
instances of improper argument appears to be growing, the North Dakota
Supreme Court appears quite reluctant to reverse a verdict solely on the
basis of improper argument, with the last such reversal occurring in
1986.17
This Viewpoint will explore some of the problems which arise when
unfair or misleading comments are made in closing argument, examine
the procedures in place relating to those problem areas, and offer sugges-
tions on how we might better deal with improper closing arguments.
II. DANGERS OF IMPROPER CLOSING ARGUMENTS
A. PREJUDICE AND CONFUSION
It must be conceded at the outset that closing arguments do not
affect the outcome of many trials.18 Jurors often have their minds made
up before closing argument, and most jurors decide cases on the basis of
the evidence and jury instructions rather than on argument. 9 Neverthe-
less, closing arguments are very important to some jurors.20
(d) A lawyer should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty
to decide the case on the evidence by injecting issues broader than the guilt or
innocence of the accused under the controlling law or by making predictions of
the consequences of the juy's verdict.
(e) It is the responsibility of the court to ensure that final argument to the jury is kept
within proper, accepted bounds.
Id.
16. North Dakota history is filled with "colorful" closing arguments, ranging from a prosecutor's
reference to an alleged cattle thief as "Mustached Maude, the queen of the cattle rustlers," State v.
Black, 223 N.W. 567, 569 (N.D. 1929), to an alleged description of one attorney by the other as
"hired by his Satanic Majesty in Sioux County[.]" State v. Turner, 229 N.W. 7, 11 (N.D. 1930).
Modern arguments, though less "colorful," often have substantial potential to prejudice. Compare
South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819,840 (N.D. 1980) (finding error in counsel's
comments on other parties' failure to introduce evidence which was clearly inadmissible) with State v.
Kunkel, 366 N.W.2d 799, 803 (N.D. 1985). The affidavits of jurors recite that the prosecuting
attorney compared defendant to a Nazi and further said, "I think he's guilty as hell." There was
substantial evidence from others present at trial that the remarks were not made. Id. See also State v.
Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409, 418 (N.D. 1981) (discussing statements by prosecuting attorney that the
defendant had committed illegal acts which were not established by the evidence).
17. Priel v. R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65 (N.D. 1986) (reversing a district court judgment on the
grounds that attorney for the defendant incorrectly advised the jury that his client had no insurance).
18. TANFORD, supra note 5 at 369.
19. 1I
20. In mock trials held at the School of Law, we are able to hear juries deliberate. In complex
cases and close decisions, jurors often rely strongly on what is said in closing argument.
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Misstatement of the law or evidence may interfere with the jury's
ability to render a fair verdict based upon the evidence and the trial
court's instructions in a close case. 2' Appeals to passion and sympathy
might also interfere with a fair determination of a case in which there are
substantial emotional overtones present.22 Since attorneys can seldom be
sure how close a case is in the minds of jurors, substantial importance is
attached to summation.
Determining just how great of an impact improper remarks may
have had is a difficult task. Even when the jury has been admonished to
completely disregard certain comments, it may be impossible to do so. 2
Test results of scientific studies cast doubt on the ability of jurors to disre-
gard evidence and they might have similar difficulties disregarding strong
arguments.'
B. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF
IMPROPER ARGUMENT WORK AN UNDUE HARDSHIP ON
THE VICTIM OF THE IMPROPER REMARKS
Court reporters are not required to record arguments unless
requested by the parties. Unfortunately, in the heat of the moments
leading up to summation, attorneys often forget to request that arguments
be recorded. This can be truly problematic because the supreme court
usually refuses to consider claims of prejudicial closing argument when
the record has not been made. 26 Prior to commencement of summation,
attorneys must specifically request that the court reporter transcribe the
arguments.
As soon as improper remarks are made in argument to the jury, the
party victimized by the comments must comply with a variety of proce-
dural requirements in order to preserve the matter for appeal. First, a
timely objection must be raised 27 and a ruling received so that the trial
court may take appropriate action to remedy prejudice.' An objection to
closing argument made after the jury deliberations have commenced is
not timely.
29
21. See, e.g.. Priel v. R.E.D., Inc., 397 N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1986) (finding that jury was improperly
advised that deendt had no insurance when defendant did carry insurance).
22. State v. Kaiser, 417 N.W.2d 376, 379 (N.D. 1987).
23. South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 837 (N.D. 1980).
24. RONALD L. CARLSON, EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 87 (3d ed. 1993).
25. State v. Rougemont, 340 N.W.2d 47, 51 (N.D. 1983).
26. E.g., Morton v. Stensby, 232 N.W. 6, 9 (N.D. 1930).
27. Thomas v. Stickland, 500 N.W.2d 598, 601 (N.D. 1993).




Failure to timely object to an adversary's argument generally acts as a
waiver of the claim of error." "The only exception to the general rule...
is when the misconduct of counsel is so severe that it affects [a] party's
substantial rights or constitutes a denial of a fair trial, thereby placing an
independent duty upon the court to confine the attorney to the permissi-
ble bounds of argument, where necessary, and admonish the jury."31 The
power to notice error without objection is exercised cautiously and only in
exceptional circumstances where a serious injustice has been done.32
A practical consideration also requires timely objection. The longer
that the jury considers the opponent's remarks without contradiction or
objection, the greater the potential for the jurors to accept the representa-
tion as true.
In addition to a timely objection, counsel must either request a cau-
tionary instruction admonishing the jury to disregard the improper argu-
ment or move for a mistrial to preserve the matter for review.Y
Decisions as to whether to object, seek cautionary instructions, and/or
move for a mistrial requires attention to a number of very practical
considerations.
An obvious problem is that instant analysis of how badly one has
been hurt by the unfair argument is required, as well as analysis into the
likelihood that an objection will be successful. An unsuccessful objection
may draw the jury's attention to the matter and give the impression that
the opponent's argument is correct. Often, judges react to such objec-
tions by simply reminding the jury to rely on their own recollections in
determining if facts have been misrepresented.-' In the event of such a
ruling, will the jury recall the evidence correctly?
The next decision is bound to be more difficult: Should the attorney
move for a mistrial or seek a curative instruction? The decision to move
for a mistrial requires a rapid calculation of the client's needs, the
probability of success in the instant trial versus a retrial, the cost of a
retrial, and the delay which a retrial might bring. The decision as to
whether to seek a curative instruction requires an analysis of whether the
prejudice could really be cured by an instruction or whether it might
merely highlight the argument which is improper.
Improper argument often comes without warning at the worst possi-
ble time for the innocent attorney. Usually, the attorney is attempting to
listen to the opponent, judge the reaction of jurors, and put finishing
30. Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 730 (N.D. 1986).
31. Id. at 731.
32. State v. Thill, 473 N.W.2d 451, 453 (N.D. 1991).
33. Thomas v. Stickland, 500 N.W.2d 598, 601 (N.D. 1993).
34. THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 365 (3d ed. 1992).
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touches on his or her own argument or rebuttal. Determining whether
evidence has been misstated often requires going through notes, deposi-
tions, exhibits, and/or transcripts. When so many decisions are made
under such stress, some mistakes are almost inevitable. The attorney who
made the improper argument may have planned the argument long
before delivering it and might be in the best position to profit from an
opponent's mistake.
C. PROCEDURES USED TO DEAL WITH IMPROPER ARGUMENT
ARE UNFAIR TO THE TRIAL COURT
Improper arguments at the close of trial place the trial court under
substantial pressure. If an objection is made, the court must rule quickly
or risk that the longer the jury has to consider the unfair remark, the
greater damage which may be done.
If the opponent of the improper remarks does not object, the court
must determine whether action should be taken. On one hand, the judge
risks interference with the trial strategies of one of the parties. On the
other hand, failure to act in the case of misconduct affecting substantial
rights may cause reversal on appeal. 5 Rapid evaluation of the effect of
such improper argument in a complex trial is sometimes a difficult task.
Drafting of curative instructions, consideration of motions for mistrial,
and determination if admonitions should be necessary are difficult tasks
under such time pressures.
D. UNFAIR ARGUMENT BREEDS MORE UNFAIR ARGUMENT
The most common remedy for another party's improper argument is
more improper argument.36 An attorney who has been the subject of the
other attorney's personal attacks may respond in kind either because of
the emotional atmosphere present as the trial reaches conclusion, a calcu-
lated decision that a response is necessary, or the realization that there is
scant chance of appellate relief.
The reluctance of appellate courts to reverse trials on the ground of
improper argument may also encourage new attempts to test how far one
can go in summation. Not all improper argument is the result of split
second decisions by counsel. Improper closings are sometimes calculated
long before the conclusion of trial.37
35. See Priel v. R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65 (N.D. 1986).
36. Cf United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 4 (1985) (characterizing by defense of the
prosecution's case as unfair" and "reprehensible" in response to prosecution's summary of the
evidence against the defendant).
37. See, e.g., Hoffer v. Burd, 49 N.W.2d 282, 294 (N.D. 1951).
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E. THE RISK THAT ATTORNEYS WILL PROFIT FROM THEIR
IMPROPER ARGUMENTS
It has traditionally been assumed that attorneys who made improper
arguments put their clients at substantial risk. If a jury saw through
appeals to passion or misstatement of the evidence, the attorney would
lose credibility and thereby endanger the case.38 Even worse, the judge
might indicate that the attorney had acted improperly and instruct the
jury accordingly. It cannot be doubted that in some instances, juries have
found counsel's arguments offensive; however, there are a significant
number of instances in which the offending attorney prevailed.39
Hopefully, juries decide cases on the basis of the evidence and
judge's instruction rather than on improper closing argument. We cannot
be sure that this is the case. Why does there appear to be an increase in
the number of instances of improper argument? Not all of the prejudicial
statements come from inexperienced attorneys. We cannot escape the
possibility that some improper comments are the result of a calculated
risk by advocates who believe that juries may not know their arguments
are unfair.
Jurors may have a more difficult time seeing through misrepresenta-
tions of evidence in cases which are made increasingly complex by reason
of expert testimony, massive computer generated records, and the
sophisticated subject matter of today's litigation. Jurors might quickly see
misrepresentations concerning the testimony of an eyewitness, but would
they be able to detect mistakes in summarizing the voluminous sources
underlying the expert opinion of an economic or medical expert? Even
litigators thoroughly familiar with exhibits could be severely tested in such
a situation.
A final concern may be unnecessary due to the quality of North
Dakota attorneys. The concern is included because of the substantial
number of attorneys traveling into North Dakota for a single trial. An
attorney who believes that the case is going to be lost might estimate that
there is nothing to lose by improper argument. He or she would never
have to deal with the judge again, and a mistrial, although a remote possi-
bility, might be better than a loss. Making an improper argument forces
the opponent to react and risk a mistake. The potential value of prejudi-
cial remarks as a weapon is substantial.
38. See, e.g., South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 837 (N.D. 1980).
39. A number of North Dakota's reported decisions indicate that improper comments were
made by the party who prevailed both at trial and on appeal. See, e.g., City of Grand Forks v.
Cameron, 435 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1989). Acquittals are not appealed, therefore, we have few records
of improper defense remarks in closing.
1994]
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F. PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE PROFESSION
We have been hearing a great deal about attacks on the legal profes-
sion by politicians, advertisers, comedians, and the general public. Per-
haps we should pay more attention to what we say about our fellow
attorneys in closing argument.
It is an easy step to cross the line from attacking the ideas of oppos-
ing counsel to attacking the character of the attorney. When such attacks
are made, all attorneys suffer in the eyes of the public. The practice of
putting opposing counsel "on trial" is not new,4' but the continuance and
spread of the practice are very much in our own hands. Separate discipli-
nary hearings are the place to look into the conduct of those accused
rather than grandstanding in court. Our trial courts have discretion to
limit closing argument. This would be a good place to promptly invoke
that power."
III. THE NORTH DAKOTA LAW OF CLOSING ARGUMENT
A. STANDARDS USED TO DETERMINE IF ARGUMENT IS IMPROPER
Attorneys have the right to closing argument in both civil and crimi-
nal trials.4" The content of closing argument is governed entirely by com-
mon law. The control and scope of closing arguments are largely a matter
left to the discretion of the trial court.3 We are advised that the line
between proper and improper advocacy in closing argument "falls within
a huge gray area..." and that "the determination of conduct which is
not proper is, at best, a difficult assessment to make."4
The North Dakota cases on closing argument6 do not provide easy
reading. On one hand are cases which describe the allowable areas
broadly. A prosecuting attorney "is allowed a wide latitude of speech, and
must be protected therein." T4 "It is his duty to use all the convincing
power of which he has command, and the weapons of wit and satire and
of ridicule are all available to him so long as he keeps within the record." 48
On the other hand, there are a few cases which clearly set out improper
areas of argument, such as a prohibition against attorneys giving
40. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 4 (1985) (arguing by defense counsel that
prosecutors don't believe defendant is guilty).
41. Id at 13.
42. Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97, 101 (N.D. 1977).
43. State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409, 418 (N.D. 1981).
44. State v. Schimmel, 409 N.W.2d 335, 342 (N.D. 1987) (citing United States v. Young, 470
U.S. 1, 10-11 (1985)).
45. i
46. A closing is sometimes also referred to as "argument," "final argument," "jury argument,"
"summation," and other terms.
47. State v. Loyland, 149 N.W.2d 713, 731 (N.D. 1967).
48. Id
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independent testimony in closing49 and giving misleading facts about
defendant's insurance.50 In between the cases which take clear positions
are well over one-hundred cases with dicta concerning closing arguments.
Although North Dakota has had many appellate cases in which
improper closing arguments were alleged, very few have been decided on
that issue. The North Dakota Supreme Court opinions often skirt the
issue of the impropriety of the argument by finding that the trial record is
incomplete,51 the attorney failed to promptly object,52 or the argument, if
improper, was not so prejudicial as to require reversal.
For example, consider North Dakota's cases with regard to the
"Golden Rule" argument that jurors should place themselves in the posi-
tion of a litigant or allow a party the same recovery as the jurors would
wish if they were in the same position. North Dakota courts have never
reversed a trial court for allowing "Golden Rule" arguments,' 4 although a
warning has been given that such "arguments should generally be
avoided." Even where the "Golden Rule" argument was clearly used,
the supreme court found it did not appeal to the sympathy of the jury or
constitute inflammatory argument and hence was not prejudicial.' On
the other hand, a case was reversed when plaintiffs counsel asked jurors
to imagine their wives in the place of the plaintiff.57 One could argue that
the law is not very clear in the area of the use of the "Golden Rule."
Without going through all of the dicta in all of the cases involving
closing arguments, I suggest that lawyers and courts are not well served
by such difficult case law to follow every time a closing argument is given.
We would be better served by a set of guidelines which would more
clearly outline the permissible types of argument and prohibited
practices.
Rules of professional responsibility often touch upon the conduct of
attorneys in giving closing argument; however, these rules have not served
49. Id. See King v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509, 516 (N.D. 1961) (arguing that
the plaintiff was entitled to damages for pain and suffering on per diem figures with no basis in the
evidence); State v. Nyhus, 124 N.W. 71, 75 (N.D. 1909) (claiming that the defendant had ruined two
girls' lives when there was no evidence that the girls' lives were ruined).
50. Priel v. R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65, 68 (N.D. 1986).
51. See Sabot v. Fargo Women's Health Org., 500 N.W.2d 889, 893 (N.D. 1993).
52. See Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 731 (N.D. 1986).
53. See Thomas v. Stickland, 500 N.W.2d 598, 601 (N.D. 1993).
54. See Cf Brauer v. James J. Igoe & Sons Constr. Inc., 186 N.W.2d 459, 473 (N.D. 1971)
(finding that while argument may have been improper it did not constitute prejudicial error).
55. Glatt v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 383 N.W. 2d 473, 481 (N.D. 1986).
56. See Larson v. Meyer, 135 N.W.2d 145, 161-62 (N.D. 1965) (overruled in part on other
grounds by Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85, 94 (N.D. 1988)).
57. Crosby v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 237 N.W. 803, 809 (N.D. 1931).
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as a basis for reported North Dakota decisions involving improper
argument.58
B. LIMITED REMEDIES AFTER IMPROPER ARGUMENT HAS BEEN
MADE
Courts have a limited number of alternatives once improper argu-
ment has been made. Curative instructions can be given, a mistrial
declared, and/or attorneys sanctioned. Appellate courts have even fewer
options, since the decision must be either to reverse or affirm the trial
court. All of these solutions are akin to closing the barn door after the
horses are out.
A party should not be deprived of a verdict in his or her favor
because of improper conduct of his or her counsel unless prejudice is
clear.59 There is a reluctance of courts to grant mistrials. ° There have
been no reported sanctions of attorneys for improper argument. Appel-
late courts have been very reluctant to reverse a trial court's denial of
motions for a mistrial or a new trial absent a clear indication that the
improper comment, in light of all the evidence, swayed the jury's decision
in criminal cases.61 In civil matters, the improper remark must be shown
to have clearly deprived the adverse party of a fair trial.6" The tests are
difficult at best.
The remedy most often relied upon is the curative instruction
together with the presumption that juries follow the instructions to disre-
gard particular remarks.63 There is no way of being sure that jurors will
disregard such information. However, there is substantial cause for
skepticism.64
C. IN SEARCH OF A BETTER SOLUTION
Rather than deal with improper argument after it is delivered, could
we find a way to prevent the problem from occurring? Could we agree on
some minimal guidelines for closing arguments which would allow courts
and attorneys to set boundaries on closing argument before the argument
58. See State v. Schimmel, 409 N.W.2d 335 (N.D. 1987). "We point out that the purpose of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is to act as both an inspirational guide for the members of the
legal profession and as a basis for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the
minimum standards presented by the Code." Id. at 343-44.
59. Hoffer v. Burd, 49 N.W.2d 282, 295 (N.D. 1951).
60. State v. Kaiser, 417 N.W.2d 376, 379 (N.D. 1987) (stating that a mistrial is an "extreme
remedy" used when there is a "fundamental defect" or -manifest injustice").
61. See State v. Paulson, 477 N.W.2d 208, 210 (N.D. 1991).
62. Thomas v. Strickland, 500 N.W.2d 598, 601 (N.D. 1993) (citing the standard derived from
Hoffer v. Burd, 49 N.W.2d 278, 294 (N.D. 1951)).
63. Cf. State v. Paulson, 477 N.W.2d 208, 210 (N.D. 1991) (finding trial court's curative
instruction proper).
64. See CARLSON, supra note 24.
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was delivered? The recommendations which follow are made in the
belief that action can often be taken to prevent improper argument with-
out unduly restricting closing argument.
IV. THREE RECOMMENDATIONS
A. A REQUIREMENT OF RECORDING CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Is there really any reason why all closing arguments should not be
recorded? In the days before computers, there was an obvious hardship
on court reporters who were required to type jury instructions at about
the same time that final arguments were given. With today's technology,
the hardship is greatly reduced.
When the supreme court held that closing argument need not be
recorded unless requested by counsel, it noted that attorneys might prefer
not to have closing arguments recorded in order to have more leeway in
summation.65 Several years of experience have indicated that giving more
leeway is not always a good idea, especially if the lack of a record prevents
an appellate court from acting in the event of improper argument.
B. GUIDELINES FOR CLOSING ARGUMENT
In evaluating whether or not statements made in closing argument
are improper, North Dakota trial courts rely on guidelines provided by
the common law. I have attempted to illustrate that our common law
guidelines are not easily accessible and are sometimes less than clear.
One of the disadvantages in states with small populations and high stan-
dards of professionalism is that there are fewer cases which provide the
opportunity to develop a common law of improper closing argument. We
have enough references to closing argument in our decisions to make
research difficult, but not enough meaningful cases to develop the sort of
guidance which judges and attorneys would find useful.
Easily accessible guidelines are particularly helpful to attorneys. A
list of general rules which could be used in preparing closing arguments,
and then testing them before delivery can prevent many improper argu-
ments from being delivered. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently
reprinted the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice dealing with closing
arguments of both prosecutors and criminal defense counsel.6
There are two difficulties with the ABA Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice which lead me to propose an alternative to them. First, the ABA
standards were meant to apply only to criminal cases. I believe it would
65. See State v. Rougemont, 340 N.W.2d 47,50 (N.D. 1983) (referring to the court's ruling from
Square Butte Elec. Coop. v. Dohn, 219 N.W.2d 877 (N.D. 1974)).
66. State v. Salitros, 499 N.W. 2d 815, 817-18 (Minn. 1993).
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be desirable to develop standards which could be used to promote high
standards in both civil and criminal cases. Second, the ABA standards
concentrate only on what is not proper, rather than also providing a state-
ment of what is proper. A better set of guidelines would provide positive
as well as negative standards.
Couldn't a set of guidelines be developed which would provide use-
ful guidance in preparing arguments and which would embody the best of
the nation's common law experiences? A number of writers suggest just
such a possibility. Consider the following guidelines which are similar to
the advantages of good closing argument on the first page of this
Viewpoint:
Guidelines For Closing Argument:
Attorneys for all parties shall be entitled to make a closing argument
to the jury after all evidence has been received. Attorneys may:
1. Explain the theory of the client's case.
6 7
2. Review the evidence which has been admitted at trial and
discuss the importance of items of evidence to the theory of
the case.'
3. Urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences and conclu-
sions from the evidence.
6 9
4. Demonstrate that the evidence satisfies all legal require-
ments for a verdict in favor of the client.70
5. Persuade the jury within the bounds of admitted evidence
and the court's instructions that justice is best served if a
verdict is returned for the client.71
6. Rebut an opponent's allegations within the bounds of the
evidence admitted and the trial court's jury instructions. 72
7. Confront head-on the prejudices which jurors bring with
them in their deliberations.7'
During closing argument an attorney may not:
1. Misstate the evidence.7 4
2. Ask the jury to consider inadmissible evidence. 5
3. Misstate the law.76
67. LUBET, supra note 2, at 385.
68. Id
69. Id at 393-394.
70. TANFORD, supra note 5, at 370.
71. JEANs, supra note 8, § 18.9.
72. TANFORD, supra note 5, at 370.
73. McELuNEY, supra note 7, at 496.
74. State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409, 418-19 (N.D. 1981).
75. South v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 839-40 (N.D. 1980).
76. State v. Jacob, 222 N.W.2d 586, 590-91 (N.D. 1974).
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4. State the attorney's personal belief ,7
5. Make undue appeals to emotion.78
6. Comment on privileged matters. 79
7. Make personal attacks on other attorneys.Ws
8. Appeal to the pecuniary interest of jurors.8 '
9. Threaten that jurors may suffer if an unfavorable verdict is
returned.
82
The guidelines are not complete and may be modified by the courts.
They do give guidance on issues which most commonly are the subject of
appeals yet do not unduly restrict attorneys in arguing for their clients.
Hopefully, annotations to the guidelines would focus research by categori-
zation of specific types of issues. Attorneys and judges should not have to
read through dozens of cases generally labeled "improper argument" to
find the few cases concerning a specific type of improper argument.
Because the guidelines do not have the full force of law, they could
be modified by the trial court in accord with the needs of a given case.
Since the guidelines are available before trial, any party who believes that
the guidelines are unduly restrictive can seek modification before the trial
begins or at least before argument. The court may also consider addi-
tional guidelines or issues which should be discussed. In the relative calm
of pretrial hearings, the issues may be more intelligently discussed, and
authority may be cited.
C. COLLECT INFORMATION TO ALLOW NECESSARY
MODIFICATIONS TO THE GUIDELINES
The requirement that all closing arguments be recorded should pro-
vide significant resource material for evaluation of problem areas. Argu-
ments which do not reach appellate courts for a variety of reasons still
may provide useful material to those seeking improvements in this impor-
tant area of advocacy.
77. LUBET, supra note 2, at 432-33 (citing Rule 3.4(e) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct).
78. State v. Paulson, 477 N.W.2d 208, 210 (N.D. 1991).
79. N.D. R. EvID. 512.
80. Missouri K. T. R. Co. v. Ridgway, 191 F.2d 363, 369 (8th Cir. 1951).
81. Cf Byrns v. St. Louis County, 295 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1980) (discussing the impropriety of
statements aimed at the self-interests of jurors).
82. Cf. Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W:2d 716,731 (N.D. 1986) (finding statements which could
be interpreted as a threat to jurors deserve immediate court admonishment to the jurors to disregard
the statement).
1994]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
V. CONCLUSION
Closing arguments are basic to both jury and nonjuy trials in North
Dakota, and yet, there has been little recent effort to improve this ele-
ment of our trials. To the contrary, it appears that unfair comment is
more likely than ever to find its way into trials. Unless fair guidelines are
easily accessible to attorneys, mistakes of the past will be repeated by
inexperienced attorneys and perhaps by some experienced attorneys who
take advantage of the reluctance of appellate courts to reverse a case for
misconduct of counsel.
It is possible to make some improvements in our closing arguments
without unduly limiting the freedom necessary to adequately represent
our clients' interests. By providing clear and flexible guidelines before
closing arguments are given, we greatly reduce the chance of innocent
error which might cause a mistrial or reversal at the client's expense. We
also provide a fairer trial by removing some of the distractions which
could improperly influence jurors.
Nothing that our profession does is so much in the public eye as our
closing arguments. The news media focus on summation as do historians,
dramatic artists, and the general public. Improvement in our trial system
should be made regardless of whatever publicity will be given, but there
may be no better way to represent to others the importance of our calling
and the steps we are taking to improve our system than to begin with our
closings.
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